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Abstract
With real-time certificate validation checking, a
public-key-using system that needs to validate a certificate
executes a transaction with a specialized validation party.
At the end of the transaction the validation party returns an
indication about the validity status of the certificate. This
paper analysis the public key (PbK) certificate validation
service from a practical point of view by describing the im-
plementation of a system that makes use of the Data Valida-
tion and Certification Server (DVCS) protocols to provide
certificate validation service to the Relying Parties (RPs).
However the system is not restricted to use only the speci-
fied protocol and allows the integration of other validation
protocols or mechanisms. Our implementation efforts em-
phasize the possibility to pursue a specific RP tradeoff be-
tween timeliness, security and computational resource us-
age via dynamic selection of several configurable options.
Keywords: PKI, certificate validation, DVCS, validation
options.
1 INTRODUCTION
Despite widely recognized importance of Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), significant design issues that impede
the scalability and interoperability among large scale PKIs
are still open. One particularly debated aspect is the
mechanism for validating PbK certificates. None of the
mechanisms proposed so far for certificate validation (CV)
could alone meet the computational, network and secu-
rity requirements of all relying party applications and PKI
topologies. CV is a complex process and requires the con-
struction and validation of certification paths. Shortly, this
is named also certificate path processing. A certification
path is said to be valid under a set of certificate policies that
are common to all certificates in the path [1]. Certificate
path processing must be implemented in every certificate-
using system or in a server that supports that system.
The IETF PKIX working group defined the require-
ments [2] and is currently examining validation protocols
[3] [4] [5] used in client-server architectures where the
client can delegate the path processing to a server with
the scope to minimize the relying party’s client complex-
ity. In these schemes certificate path processing is passed
partially or totally from the RP to a dedicated server, fur-
ther called Certificate Validation Server (CVS). The proto-
cols deal with certification paths processing against a num-
ber of CVS constraints called validation policies. To per-
form its task, the CVS extracts data from a number of re-
sources (e.g. directories, local repositories) and communi-
cates with various external servers.
This paper describes first a Secure Architecture for the
Validation of X.509v3 Certificates (SAVaCert) based on
the client-server model and designed at a suitable level of
abstraction. General functionality is defined for the com-
ponent modules to allow implementers to choose particu-
lar protocols and validation mechanisms on the client and
server sides. Once a specific protocol is chosen, it is use-
ful to give to relying parties the possibility to dynamically
select (depending on their current context) the most appro-
priate validation parameters and send them to the server.
In other words, SAVaCert allows clients to specify differ-
ent validation profiles in accordance with their timeliness,
security and power/network resources requirements. Ad-
ditionally, the user has the possibility to send to the server
either the exact input certificate policy data to be used by
the CVS during path validation or it can give vague indi-
cations, like its intended usage of the certificate, by using
the method explained in Section 2. Section 3 describes our
implementation of SAVaCert based on the use of DVCS
protocols [5] and of existent implementations for the mod-
ules on the server.
SAVaCert is addressed to the following categories of users:
a. thin and off-line users, i.e. users that are scarce in com-
putational and respectively network resources.
b. enterprise environments, i.e. environments where the
policy control and management of trust is performed cen-
trally. The security administrators can configure and main-
tain policy data and trusted anchors on a dedicated CVS
and the enterprise users can delegate the certificate path
processing to a trusted CVS. Most of the users have little
or no idea about security policies and operating practices of
various CAs, about retrieving the freshest certificate status
(CS) information for each certificate in the path or about se-
curely obtaining, storing and maintaining the most-trusted
CAs [6] [7]. These clients trust the CVS to extract the nec-
essary data and perform the path processing.
c. simplified users need assistance from the CVS to mini-
mize the risk of using invalid certificates. This category of
users would require CVS to evaluate the certificate policies
and construct the certificate chains or to retrieve on-line
responses (called OCSP responses [8]) containing the re-
vocation status of a certificate. In this case the CVS is not
necessarily trusted.
2 DESCRIPTION OF SAVaCert
The purpose of this section is the description of the ar-
chitecture for PbK certificate validation at a suitable level
of abstraction. The main components of the architecture
and their functionality are described such that to permit a
number of implementation possibilities. In SAVaCert the
client delegates subtasks (e.g. only path discovery) or the
entire task (e.g. path discovery and path validation) of cer-
tificate path processing to a server, as it is depicted in Fig-
ure 1.
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Figure 1: SAVaCert Components
We’ll recall shortly the main steps to be performed in
order to validate a certificate, called also targetCert:
a. path construction. This may require a path discovery
task resulting in several certification paths found by the
CVS for a certain targetCert .
b. execution of a path validation algorithm that includes
certificate verification (i.e. whether it has expired or is re-
voked) for each certificate in the path and the processing of
path constraints. The algorithm must verify also the digital
signature on each certificate, check that the required cer-
tificate policies are indicated in the certificates and check
that the names in the certificates are consistent with a valid
certification path, that is, the subject of every certificate
in the path is the issuer of the next certificate (except the
root CA). Besides the targetCert, the request sent on L1
can contain optionally data such as certificate revocation
data or policy information. The RP relies on the CVS to
perform a service constrained by the so-called validation
policy, under which the validation is requested and that the
RP considers acceptable for one PKI-enabled application.
CVS constructs a response containing either the results of
verifications for the targetCert or an error message. Ford
and Baum [9] note that it is helpful to consider the certifi-
cation path discovery and validation as two separate tasks.
Their implementations may be separate because the cer-
tification path discovery is not a security-critical function
whereas the path validation is.
In this model the Validation Module of the CVS is not
viewed as an ad-hoc application but has been further split
in several components each of which has a dedicated task
as described next:
Validation Protocol Module (VPM). The main role of this
module is to manage the messages exchanged on link L1.
The module contains functions to create, print, sign, parse
requests and responses.
Path Validation Module (PVM). Its main role is to execute
path validation to determine the validation status one tar-
getCert. The algorithms for path validation are included in
this abstract module.
Path Construction Module (PCM). The role of this mod-
ule is to construct certification paths. Efficient algorithms
for path development, which use certificate extensions
and loop detection/elimination techniques to increase ef-
ficiency [10] [11], are embedded at this abstract level.
Certificate Status Module (CSM) has to determine the sta-
tus of a certificate. The code for retrieving and pro-
cessing CRLs is contained in this module. If required,
an OCSP client is integrated here to communicate with
various OCSP responders. Support for other revocation
mechanisms, like for example Certificate Revocation Trees
(CRTs) or authenticated dictionaries, is included also in
this module.
Policy Processing Module (PPM). The role of this module
is to process policies. This module is divided further in
submodules, one of them processes the certificate policies
and the other one processes the validation policies.
Time module (TM). The role of this module is to give an
indication of time. The simplest form is time represented
as GeneralizedTime but alternate forms include a TST [12]
or a DVC [5].
The Storage Module is used to store/retrieve certificates,
certificate revocation data and policies. Each module ac-
cesses the other modules through interfaces. A typical
server application receives and parses the request by mak-
ing calls to VPM. The values contained in the request fields
are passed as input to the PVM or PCM, which will make
further calls to functions from the other modules. The Vali-
dation Module is not based on a particular cryptographic li-
brary or certificate management library to allow developers
to freely choose the underlying support. Since certificates
and all PKIX protocols are specified using Abstract Syntax
Notation 1 (ASN.1), a component will be also required to
perform ASN.1 parsing and generation. This component is
also considered in SAVaCert as being part of the underlying
support.
This is a general architecture, void of details on the
use of a specific protocol. Thus, L1 and L2 can be mapped
onto particular protocols of choice. CVS uses L2 to update
the secure database and to communicate with other TTPs.
Not all modules are compulsory. If the task of the CVS
is to perform path discovery then only the VPM, PCM and
sub modules from the PPM are present while the others are
optional. Similarly the RP can contain a variable number
of modules. For example thin clients [13] would require
the VPM and optionally the support for digital signing.
In SAVaCert the RP can configure several parameters to
control or restrict the validation process. We have divided
them into the following distinct categories:
Validation Parameters. The RP must have a mean to in-
dicate to the CVS how much information used during path
processing must be included into the response, e.g. PbK
certificates, CRLs, OCSP responses, validation time. The
RP must be able also to verify finally that the CVS has
made the verifications using the validation parameters ac-
cordingly.
Certificate Policy Processing Parameters. When validat-
ing one targetCert, the PPM must examine the certificate
policies of the CAs from one certification path. The RP
sets these parameters to specify its strict or weak certificate
policy requirement (CPR) to the CVS. The strict CPR is
used when the RP knows the set of certificate policies that
are acceptable for its intended use. Additionally, the RP
can give an indication to the CVS about how to process the
policy constraints. In this case the CVS can give an on/off
response, i.e. it will indicate the path to be valid only if
it is valid under one of the certificate policies specified in
the set and it would return the subset for which the path is
valid. Instead the RPs specify weak CPR to give a general
indication about the intended usage of the certificate (e.g.
e-mail) when they don’t know which policies are accept-
able for their use and consequently they ask the CVS to
build and validate the appropriate certification path(s).
Validation Protocol Module (VPM) Parameters are char-
acteristic to the protocol chosen for the link L1.
3 A PRACTICAL APPROACH
The IETF PKIX working group defined the Data Val-
idation and Certification Server (DVCS) and the protocols
to be used when communicating with it. The role of the
server is to assert the validity of signed documents, pub-
lic key certificates and the possession or existence of data.
From these functionalities we were particularly interested
in the service that allows a client to offload certificate val-
idation to a server. In this case, SAVaCert consists ba-
sically of a DVCS server that makes use of various data
sources and communicates with various servers to provide
signed response structures called Data Validation Certifi-
cates (DVCs) to the DVCS clients. The DVCs contains
validation results and trustworthy time information that as-
serts the validity status of PbK certificates.
A DVCS transaction begins with a client preparing a
request that contains data for which validity is to be cer-
tified, data to be used by the server during the verifica-
tion processes and extensions to carry additional data. The
clients can ask the server to validate more than one certifi-
cate at once. Thus, all the targetCerts, the chains (if any)
and the policy information are embedded into one single
request. The client prepares the request by making calls to
the VPM. The client can control the validation process by
setting several parameters with a simple interface as illus-
trated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Sample DVCS client profile
At this step the client choose to use strict or weak CPR.
In case of strict CPR the client can specify an acceptable
policy set consisting of one or more acceptable certificate
policies identifiers which the VPM inserts in the request
in the acceptable policy set. For example, the client may
choose to accept only paths consistent with some high-
assurance certificate policy identifier. The PPM on the
server will indicate the path to be valid only if it is valid
under one or more of the policies specified in this set and
it would return the subset of the acceptable policy set for
which the path is valid.
Additionally, the client can give indications to the
server about how to process the certificate policy OID ex-
tensions. Thus, two boolean flags in the request, an ex-
plicit policy required and inhibit policy mapping (whose
meaning is identical to the fields in the Policy Constraints
[6]) can be set to indicate further to the server whether or
not the policy mapping is allowed and to explicitly spec-
ify the policies required. In this context their effect is to
allow the client to set the policy constraints state immedi-
ately, without waiting for the certificate extension to ap-
pear in the path. The explicit policy required determines
if an acceptable policy identifier as defined in [6] needs to
explicitly appear in the certificate policies extension field
of all certificates in the path. By setting to true this flag,
the client indicates that the certificate policies in the chain
must be consistent with the acceptable policy set. The in-
hibit policy mapping determines if policy mapping will be
inhibited or not during path processing. By setting this flag
to true the client indicates to the server that the identifiers
in the acceptable policy set must not be mapped by a CA
in the chain. If the client chooses the strict CPR but it
doesn’t specify an acceptable policy set and the flags then
the fields of the request used for storing these values are left
blank. This will be interpreted by the CVS that any policy
is acceptable for the client. In the other case, if the client
chooses the weak CPR, the VMP doesn’t insert specific cer-
tificate policy data but rather the client’s general criterion
is inserted as extension in the request. We note that the ab-
sence of certificate policy data in the request (acceptable
policy set and flags) must not lead the server to the con-
clusion that any policy is acceptable if the extension of the
request contains some data. When the server constructs the
response it will set the acceptable policy set to indicate the
set of certificates for which the certification path is valid
and the policy mappings that were processed. If the De-
fault option is chosen in the Figure 2 as weak CPR then
this means that any policy is acceptable for the client.
Validation parameters help a client to indicate the val-
idation policy under which the validation is requested and
under which the DVCS server operates. The client can ex-
press this policy with an identifier that the VPM inserts into
the request in the requestPolicy field of the requestInforma-
tion structure. This case can be applied if the client knows
in advance both the validation policy that is appropriate for
one particular application as well as its unique identifier.
Another possibility would be either to map the validation
options to an identifier or to define extensions in the re-
quest (possibly also in the requestInformation structure) to
hold the validation options but in this case the server must
be able to process these extensions. The client can verify
that the server has made the verification in accordance to
the validation parameters because a copy of the requestIn-
formation of the corresponding request is inserted in the
response.
The client can set also a number of VPM Parameters
due to the use of DVCS for L1, such as: check the valid-
ity of the server’s signing certificate using on-line or off-
line mechanisms; store part of the information for later use;
trust or not the unsigned responses (this may be the case if
the client uses a transport mechanism that provides server
authentication); require CMS encapsulation [14] for the re-
quest or to establish an SSL channel [15] to ensure not only
server authentication but also the confidentiality of data ex-
changed.
When it receives one request the server checks first if
the request is valid, e.g. whether it contains an acceptable
time, the correct name of the server, the correct request in-
formation and the appropriate service. The VPM extracts
from the request one targetCert and passes it to the PVM.
The certificates and algorithms for validation of certifica-
tion paths discussed in this paper will respect the conven-
tions of X.509 [1] and the PKIX [6] [7] profile even though,
according to the above mentioned standard, any algorithm
could be implemented as long as the results are guaranteed
to be the same as these standard algorithms.
If more than one targetCert is present in the request
then they will be processed sequentially. Unless the client
has inserted also a set of certificates in the request to be
used for the construction of the certification paths, or if
the server’s local policy does not allow to use this set, the
PVM calls functions from the PCM in order to execute a
path discovery process. Other extensions of the request
can be defined to support the certificate path construction
on the server but they are beyond the scope of this pa-
per. The path discovery will result in a number of possible
‘valid’ chains called candidate chains. To choose the cor-
rect chain the PCM needs to receive from the VPM the val-
ues of the request fields that contain either the policy OIDs
and policy constraints flags or the extension that contain
a client’s vague criterion. In other words, the server can
determine the certificate policy processing method chosen
by the client only after it retrieves the fields in the request
that carry the certificate policy data and the appropriate re-
quest extension. If none of the above data is present in
the request then the server concludes that the client con-
siders acceptable any policy. The server cannot determine
exactly at this point which paths are good without doing a
path validation also. Thus, one candidate chain is passed
as input to the PVM to be processed. Throughout the path
validation process the name constraints are checked also
and function calls are made to the PPM to check the policy
constraints. If required, functions from CSM and TM are
called to return OCSP or TSP [12] responses. After com-
pletion of path validation there could still be more than one
path satisfying the client’s criteria. In the simplest case,
which is also the most common, the client is asking for a
single chain. Finally, the server PVM returns the validation
results and the other related data (like the set of policies
used and the mappings that were processed during the exe-
cution of certificate path validation algorithm) to the VPM
which will construct a DVC or an error message. When the
client receives the DVC, it will verify first that the server
signing certificate is valid if the client has configured this
option. The client will interpret further the response. For
example, if validation for one certificate failed because of
revocation, the client presents the CRL in a GUI display.
The first step in implementing SAVaCert was the im-
plementation of the VPM to generate, parse, sign and verify
DVCS messages by making use of OpenSSL [16]. For the
DER [17] functions the Valicert parser [18] was used and
the code has been slightly modified afterwards. To enable
OCSP functionality we’ve embedded an OCSP client into
the CSM and the calls to this module are made via a sim-
ple OCSP client API [19]. For the PCM and PVM we’ve
used the Certificate Path Development Library [20] and re-
spectively the Certificate Management Library [21]. Other
freeware implementations for building/validating certifi-
cate chains are available and may be used, such as IBM’s
Jonah PKIX reference implementation [22] or Pequi [23].
To support the weak CPR we chose a secure database
whose physical format allows the storage of an indication
of the purposes for which one certificate is trusted [24].
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Certificate validation is an important process because
if it were done in an incorrect manner or incompletely an
end entity would use the certificate deemed to be valid.
This paper describes the components and the functionality
of a general modular architecture for certificate validation
named SAVaCert. Further our implementation of SAVaC-
ert was described. The system is based on the client-server
model and the DVCS protocol. Nevertheless clients and
servers are not restricted in SAVaCert to use particular pro-
tocols. Moreover clients can specify parameters to control
the validation process. Our future work will be focused
on evaluating the complexity of the server and comparison
with other proposed certificate validation protocols.
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